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This thesis investigates the relation between ownership structure and firm performance using a sample of 2,120 publicly
traded European companies. The question of whether this relation should be positive or negative has been the subject of a
wide-ranging discussion and was addressed by many researchers. Of particular interest have been management, family, and
employee owners. Nevertheless, there is no consensus in the literature, and empirical studies on European companies are
scarce.
Utilising data from the European Federation of Employee Share Ownership (EFES) and the Bureau Van Dijk Orbis database,
this relation is analysed using multiple linear regression with continuous and categorical predictors. The results show that firms
having a management owner concentration up to strategic levels report a significantly higher Tobin’s Q than firms having a no
or no significant management concentration. The same effect holds true for family owners and employee owners. Measuring
the ownership structure as the fraction of shares of the largest shareholder does not yield a significant effect and highlights
the value of management, family, and employee owners.
Keywords: Ownership concentration; family ownership; management ownership; employee ownership; firm performance.
1. Introduction
Ownership structures and their implications have been a
widely discussed topic for almost a century and are still in the
interest of the finance and management literature. Beginning
with the argument by Berle and Means1 in 1932 that an in-
creasing separation of ownership and control will lead to a
long-term deterioration in the value of a company, numerous
other arguments for and against it have developed.
At the same time, ownership structures are changing
worldwide. Employee Share Ownership Plans (ESOP), for
example, are gaining popularity in the United States. But
in Europe, too, growing numbers of financial participation
schemes can be observed. Between 1999 and 2005, the share
of companies offering broad-based ownership schemes rose
from 13% to 18%.2 In the case of profit-sharing plans, the
share rose from 29% to 35%.3
However, the study of ownership structures is also of
macroeconomic relevance. Family owners, in particular, have
1See Berle and Means (1932).
2See Lowitzsch, Hashi, Woodward, and (Eds.) (2009), p. 22.
3See Lowitzsch et al. (2009), p. 23.
now accumulated an intangible value that can have a signif-
icant impact on the economy as a whole. In Sweden, for ex-
ample, a single family, the Wallenbergs, controls about half of
the market capitalization of the Stockholm Stock Exchange.4
In Hong Kong, the most valuable 15 families control 84.2%
of the gross domestic product.5
But is a higher owner concentration good for the perfor-
mance of a company? There is no empirical consensus on
that in the literature, and most studies focus on an isolated
analysis of owner types. Most often discussed are manage-
ment, family, and employee owners. The results, however,
remain divided: Management owners should have positive
effects in high concentrations because they combine control
and ownership, thereby reducing agency costs.6 However,
more management owners also lead to a higher risk of en-
trenchment, allowing large shareholders to make decisions
at the expense of minority shareholders.7 Families should
have a good impact on companies because they bring finan-
4See Agnblad, Berglöf, Högfeldt, and Svancar (2001).
5See Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), pp. 107-109.
6See for example Ang, Cole, and Lin (2000), p. 83-84.
7See for example Villalonga and Amit (2006), p. 387.
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cial access and have an above-average incentive to monitor
the company.8 On the other hand, they are often accused
of abusing their power and limiting management positions
to family members.9 Finally, Employee Owners should also
have a positive influence on the company, as financial par-
ticipation increases their motivation.10 But the opposite may
also be true, as more labour participation also leads to inef-
ficient decision-making processes.11
This thesis analyses the relationship between three im-
portant owner types, i.e. management, family and employee
owners, and firm performance. It is argued that a higher con-
centration of each of these owner types should lead to better
firm performance. The results of several multiple linear re-
gressions show a significant positive correlation up to a con-
centration level where strategic ownership is exceeded. An
increase in owner concentration, therefore, is most beneficial
up to a share of 20%.
Most existing studies are using exclusively American com-
panies in their sample. This study focuses on European com-
panies and thus contributes to the current literature by apply-
ing similar models to a less investigated environment. At the
same time, this work breaks the frequently made assump-
tion of a linear relationship and provides indications that
there is an optimal concentration level for each owner. Prac-
titioners conclude from this strategic implication that sub-
optimally structured firms can improve the performance of
their firms by increasing the concentration of certain owner
groups. What this study will not do is to compare different
types of owners.
The rest of this work is structured as follows: Chapter 2
presents a set of criteria for characterizing ownership struc-
tures. By comparing the most common arguments, hypothe-
ses about the influence owner concentrations should have on
the company performance are derived. Chapter 3 introduces
the methodology used in this study and describes the vari-
ables used and the regression models. The results of the re-
gressions are then presented in Chapter 4 and evaluated in
relation to the initial question. Since the models may have
some weaknesses, possible issues and striking results are dis-
cussed further in chapter 5, where the robustness of the re-
sults is tested with the help of further models.
2. Ownership Structure and Firm Performance
2.1. Classifying Ownership Structures
In order to investigate the influence of ownership struc-
tures on firm performance, a clear method for differentiating
between different structures must first be defined. The own-
ership structure of a company can be described under three
different aspects: The identity of the owner, his share in the
company, and finally, his involvement in the company.
8See Anderson and Reeb (2003), pp.1306-1307.
9See Anderson and Reeb (2003), pp.1301-1302.
10See for example Mazibuko and Boshoff (2003), p. 31, Kurtulus and
Kruse (2017), p. 1.
11See Park, Kruse, and Sesil (2004), pp. 5-7.
The identity of an owner refers to the type of a share-
holder and includes managers, families, employees, govern-
ments, banks, foreign investors and other companies. A clas-
sification by ownership identity is relevant as different own-
ers can differ in terms of their interests, risk preferences, time
horizons and strategies.12 Shareholder value is not a univer-
sal goal of corporate strategy. For example, while family own-
ership may be associated with the goal of firm survival, state
ownership is expected to pursue political goals such as low
output prices and low unemployment rates.13 Moreover, this
also implies that hybrid ownership structures with multiple
identities can be related to diverging interests.
The second aspect, ownership concentration, is deter-
mined by the proportion of an owner’s shares in a company
and is often divided into concentrated ownership and dis-
persed ownership.14 It is not clear which threshold should
be used to differentiate between these two types of owner-
ship. There is agreement in the literature, however, that a
stake of less than 50 per cent may be sufficient to give a
block holder ultimate control over the company.15 Often a
threshold of 20 or 25 per cent is applied as a definition for
concentrated ownership.16 Accordingly, a structure in which
no shareholder owns more than 20 per cent of the company’s
shares is defined as dispersed ownership.
A third aspect to describe the ownership structure of a
company is the involvement of the owner which can be mea-
sured, e.g. as the number of an owner’s votes or as the num-
ber of top executive positions filled by members of a certain
identity. A typology to classify the interaction between the
owner and the company is to differentiate between relational
and transactional owners.17 A relational owner is a long-term
oriented shareholder with complex profit and growth goals
for a company. Such a characteristic can often be found in
families. A transactional owner, on the other hand, does not
engage in further relations with the company except for ob-
taining returns. Such a characteristic can be often found in
institutional investors.
As ownership involvement is difficult to measure, this as-
pect is neglected in most studies, and so it will be in this the-
sis. Hence, the ownership identity and concentration are the
two most widely used aspects to classify a company’s owner-
ship structure.
2.2. Literature Review
The relationship between different ownership structures
and firm performance has been the subject of numerous stud-
ies since Berle and Means18 and has led to a widely discussed
12See Aguilera and Jackson (2003), pp. 450f.
13See for example Lins, Volpin, and Wagner (2013); Thomsen and Peder-
sen (2000).
14See Pedersen and Thomsen (1997), pp. 765-769.
15See Faleye, Mehrotra, and Morck (2006), p. 7.
16See for example Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera (2016); Lins et al. (2013);
Pedersen and Thomsen (1997).
17See for example Aguilera and Jackson (2003); David, O’Brien,
Yoshikawa, and Delios (2010), p. 638.
18See Berle and Means (1932).
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disagreement about whether and what kind of relationship
exists. Most studies have focused on an isolated consider-
ation of individual owner identities and arguments for and
against each individual identity emerge. The discourse on
three of the most important ownership structures, i.e. man-
agement ownership, family ownership and employee owner-
ship, will be the subject of this section. Based on the argu-
ments presented, hypotheses about the relationship between
ownership structures and firm performance will be derived.
2.2.1. Management Ownership and Firm Performance
An important and frequently cited argument that predicts
a positive impact of managerial ownership on firm perfor-
mance is the agency theory presented by Jensen and Meck-
ling19. It analyses the relationship between a principal and an
agent, with the principals representing the owners of the firm
and the agents representing the managers. The assumption
is that owners pursue the goal of maximizing the company’s
profit and thus, shareholder value. Opposed to this are the
interests of managers who strive for personal perks, such as
high compensation. Agency costs arise when the interests of
those who run a company and have decision-making author-
ity do not coincide with the interests of the company owners.
Accordingly, companies that are wholly owned by the man-
agement have, by definition, no agency costs and thus an
optimal match between principal and agent. At the other ex-
treme are managers who do not own any shares in the com-
pany. Higher management participation should, therefore,
lead to higher company success. The notion that agency costs
vary inversely with the manager’s ownership share was ex-
amined and confirmed by Ang, Cole and Lin20 who took – as
the theory requires – non-publicly traded firms into account
in their study.
This theory is consistent with numerous empirical studies
that show a positive correlation between a higher concentra-
tion of management owners and corporate success. Oswald
and Jahera21, for example, found a significant positive influ-
ence of officer’s and director’s stockholdings on performance
variables such as excess stock return, return on assets (ROA)
and return on equity (ROE) in a sample of 645 companies
listed on the New York and American Stock Exchange.
Core and Larcker22 argue that there is an equilibrium
where managers are optimally involved in the company.
They have focused their sample on companies that have
introduced a target ownership plan, which stipulates that
managers own a certain minimum number of shares in the
company. They observed statistically higher stock price re-
turns in the first six months of a fiscal year in which such a
plan was announced. In addition, these companies showed
statistically higher excess accounting returns in the two years
following the introduction of the plan. An increase in the
19See Jensen and Meckling (1976), pp. 312-319.
20See Ang et al. (2000), pp. 81-83.
21See Oswald and Jahera Jr (1991), pp 324f.
22See Core and Larcker (2002), p. 321, p. 338.
management’s stake in the company, who have a below-
equilibrium percentage of shares, therefore has a positive
impact on performance.
On the other hand, the theory that a higher proportion
of management owners leads to a higher company valuation
has been challenged by the entrenchment hypothesis.23 Man-
agers who own at least a certain percentage of the company
can become entrenched and exploit this situation at the ex-
pense of smaller shareholders.24 More management owner-
ship should, therefore, also lead to more entrenchment. A
study by Morck, Schleifer and Vishny25, however, does not
find a clear answer to this hypothesis. Although Tobin’s Q
decreases at a management concentration between 5 and 25
per cent compared to the concentration category between 0
and 5 per cent, as soon as the management ownership ex-
ceeds 25 per cent, Tobin’s Q increases again, which argues
against entrenchment.
Demsetz26 presented another argument that questions
the relationship between management ownership and firm
performance. The agency theory – also called the convergence-
of-interest hypothesis – is based on the false assumption
that all managers primarily strive for higher corporate prof-
itability. However, since not all managers have the same
objectives, they will work only for companies that fit their
preferences. At the same time, companies compensate their
managers to adjust for the agency costs incurred which,
eventually, will lead to an optimal balance between manage-
ment and non-management owners in every company. The
ownership structure of a company is thus an endogenous
consequence of the decisions of current and future share-
holders and should therefore not have any influence on the
company. For example, in a non-optimal dispersed owner-
ship structure, a company would, if necessary, carry out an
appropriate concentration of management shares itself to
compensate for its ineffectiveness.
Empirical evidence of this idea can be found in studies
by Demsetz and Villalong and, Yixiang.27 Both conclude that
there is no link between management shares and business
success when the ownership structure is modelled as an en-
dogenous variable. But even this approach is not consistently
found in the literature. Kapopoulos and Lazaretou28, for ex-
ample, have applied the same model and for their sample
have shown that a higher concentration of management own-
ers is associated with higher firm performance. They looked
at a sample of 175 companies listed in Greece and measured
performance using ROA and Tobin’s Q.
Based on the argumentation presented and the evidence
hinted at in the literature, it can be concluded that there is
still no clear position on the relationship between these two
variables. However, since a tendency towards a positive in-
fluence is emerging, the following hypothesis can be made:
23See Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), pp. 294f.
24See Thomsen and Pedersen (2000), p. 690.
25See Morck et al. (1988), pp.299-302.
26See Demsetz (1983), pp. 382-385.
27See Demsetz and Villalonga (2001); Yixiang (2011).
28See Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007), pp. 149-153.
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Hypothesis 1: Higher ownership concentration
of executive employees (managers) is positively
related to firm performance.
2.2.2. Family Ownership and Firm Performance
The second owner identity frequently discussed in the lit-
erature are families. In terms of the agency theory mentioned
above, family businesses should do well, since owners and
managers are often either the same persons or at least have
a close relationship with each other.
In contrast to this, however, there is the view that families
differ from typical managers in at least one essential charac-
teristic: Unlike managers, who primarily aim for the prof-
itability of the company, families have an interest in keeping
the company going for many generations. This leads to a bias
towards survival-oriented actions so that families are consid-
ered to make decisions that can come at the expense of other
shareholders.29 An example is the tendency of family busi-
nesses to limit executive management positions exclusively
to family members. This limited pool of potential, qualified
candidates can lead to a competitive disadvantage compared
to non-family businesses.30 Another example can be found
in the investment decisions of family owners. In the course
of an economic recession, family businesses reduce their in-
vestments much more than other companies, which leads to
a stronger decline in stock prices.31 According to Lins, Volpin
and Wagner32, family firms tend to underperform by 2.0 to
3.3 percentage points in a financial crisis. Moreover, when
a family holds multiple companies and one of them is hit by
a crisis, it can spread across the other healthy firms. It is,
however, questionable to what extent these results can be
generalized to other periods of the economic cycle.
This risk of power abuse by family managers implies that
companies that are owned but not managed by a family
should perform better than companies in which the family is
actively involved in the management. Hence, the agency the-
ory should not hold. Barotini and Caprio33, however, provide
evidence that when families take executive positions, they
cannot be distinguished from non-family firms and perform
at least as good as their peer groups. However, when they
are not represented on the board, family firms perform worse
than non-family firms. This result invalidates the argument
that families should not be involved in the management of a
firm.
In addition, an interest in the long survival of the com-
pany can also be interpreted just as well to the advantage
of family businesses. The historical presence of the families,
as well as their often non-diversified company portfolio and
their control of management positions, provide an exception-
ally good basis for monitoring of the company. The incen-
tives of family owners to monitor more closely arise from the
29See Lins et al. (2013), p. 2584; Anderson and Reeb (2003), pp. 1306f.
30See Anderson and Reeb (2003), pp. 1301f; Barontini and Caprio
(2006), p. 690.
31See Lins et al. (2013), pp. 2595-2598.
32See Lins et al. (2013), pp. 2595-2598.
33See Barontini and Caprio (2006), pp. 720f.
fact that the consequences of their actions directly return to
them.34 In addition, families face reputational damage in the
event of poor performance.35 There are also further advan-
tages of the long-term orientation of families: James36 ar-
gues that decisions made by managers who are members of
the founding family are generally more efficient than in other
companies. This is because their decisions are based on an al-
truistic foundation that takes into account the consequences
for the entire family and also for future family members. For
example, owner-managers of a family make more efficient
investment decisions than comparable non-family managers
when they know that they will one day hand over the busi-
ness to another family member.
Another advantage of family businesses is their financial
access. According to Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung37, most
family businesses exist in a pyramid structure in which a fam-
ily controls several companies, which in turn, control other
companies. Companies in a pyramid control structure report
higher ROA. In addition, they are often considered to have
easier access to financing, as they can benefit from a com-
mon pool of resources which is created as a result of other
firms under the family’s control. Furthermore, family firms
have a significantly lower cost of debt, which implies that
bondholders trust family firms to protect their interests bet-
ter, e.g. because of long-term survival.38
A study by Andersond and Reeb39 concludes that fam-
ily firms perform significantly better than non-family firms in
terms of Tobin’s Q and ROA. The result of the 403 firm sample
is not only statistically but also economically significant since
Tobin’s Q of family firms is ten per cent higher. Numerous
other studies show a positive influence of family owners on
firm performance.40 Thomsen and Pedersen41, on the other
hand, prove a negative influence on a data set of 435 pub-
lic companies. According to Martínez, Stöhr and Quiroga42,
the negative influence identified by some studies is due to
the fact that these studies only looked at public companies
which generally perform worse. Relevant to the study of fam-
ily ownership, on the other hand, are private companies that
perform significantly better.
In summary, stronger arguments and more empirical ev-
idence for a positive influence of family owners on the suc-
cess of a company can be found. The following hypothesis
emerges from the literature review presented here:
Hypothesis 2: Higher ownership concentration
of founding family members is positively related
to firm performance.
34See Silva and Majluf (2008), p. 610.
35See Anderson and Reeb (2003), p. 1306.
36See James (1999), p. 44, p. 52.
37See Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005), p. 661.
38See Anderson and Reeb (2003), p. 1306.
39See Anderson and Reeb (2003), pp. 1317-1322.
40See for example Martínez, Stöhr, and Quiroga (2007); Villalonga and
Amit (2006).
41See Thomsen and Pedersen (2000).
42See Martínez et al. (2007), pp. 84-86.
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2.2.3. Employee Ownership and Firm Performance
The third important owner identity to be investigated are
employees. In both the US and Europe, employee financial
participation has become increasingly important and popular.
As stated in the report on the “Promotion of Employee Partic-
ipation in Profits and Enterprise Results” (known as the PEP-
PER recommendations) by the European Commission, em-
ployee participation is tax-incentivized. This incentive is cru-
cial in explaining the increase in the number of Employee
Share Ownership Plans (ESOP), a form of employee owner-
ship.43 However, there are several other arguments that try
to explain the interaction between employee ownership and
firm performance.
It comes naturally to mind that employee share owner-
ship should have an impact on their motivation. However,
it is less clear whether this should be a positive or negative
impact. One way of looking at this question is to model this
as a game-theoretical problem.44 The idea behind this ar-
gument is that the participation of employees in the com-
pany’s success does not generate an incentive to work more
since employees can profit from the success of others even
without extra work. According to the logic of the “Prisoner’s
Dilemma”, employees can generate more profit in absolute
terms by working together cooperatively. However, they can
generate more personal utility if they shirk and rest on the
work of others. So, employees have an incentive to be a
free rider and this incentive grows with the size of the group.
This increasing incentive to shirk or the decreasing incentive
to cooperate is also often called the 1/N problem because a
worker in a group with N members receives only 1/N of the
additional reward earned.45 This becomes problematic if all
employees follow this view because then all employees will
get to the worst situation with minimal profit.
However, following Pendleton46, this game-theoretical
dilemma can be easily solved. On the one hand, there is a
consensus in the literature that repeated playing motivates
individuals to cooperate and pursue an optimal strategy. On
the other hand, shirking from one employee leads to higher
costs for all other employees. These costs would lead to
a situation where employees who resist the expectation of
working harder would be sanctioned by peer pressure, for ex-
ample. An employee ownership structure, therefore, reduces
the monitoring costs of a company. This view was confirmed
in a study by Freeman, Kruse and Blasi47, who evaluated the
responses of over 41,000 employees from 14 companies. An
anti-shirking index was calculated from the answers to the
question of how one would react if one saw an employee
working less than he or she should. The result shows that
employees who own company shares are significantly more
likely to respond to this observation actively.
43See Lowitzsch et al. (2009), pp. 13-21.
44See Park et al. (2004), pp. 5f.
45See for example Blasi, Freeman, and Kruse (2016); E. H. Kim and
Ouimet (2014).
46See Pendleton (2002), pp. 108f.
47See Freeman, Kruse, and Blasi (2008), pp. 6-10.
The other view on the question of whether employee
share ownership should have a positive or negative impact
is that it will positively motivate employees. In fact, it has
often been proven that such shares motivate employees to
work harder to increase the value of their shares. In addi-
tion, they complain less, take advantage of more training
opportunities, are absent less often, and there is generally
lower labour turnover in the company.48 Employee partici-
pation, therefore, leads to greater involvement of employees
in the performance of the company they work for and in the
implementation of their interests. Similar to family owners,
employees have survival-oriented interests and additionally
strive for employment stability.49 It follows that companies
with an employee ownership structure should survive longer
than comparable companies with a different ownership struc-
ture. The empirical investigation of this hypothesis by Park,
Kruse and Sesil50 showed that companies that are at least five
per cent owned by employees are only 76 per cent as likely to
disappear in the same period as companies without employee
ownership. This interest also leads to making certain deci-
sions of the company more comprehensible. It is argued that
employees are more willing to adapt and to accept change if
the company is forced to do so by the economic situation.
The comparison of these two views, therefore, suggests a
positive influence of employee share ownership on work mo-
tivation and is thus a first indication of a better performance
of the company.
At this point, it should be noted that a higher interest
of employees to become involved in the company can have a
negative impact on other stakeholders. As will be shown later
(see section 5.5.2), the interaction of different owners prob-
ably also plays a role in the evaluation of firm performance.
This gives rise to the danger that too much employee involve-
ment can have negative consequences for managers, for in-
stance. In the literature, this is addressed by the influence
of employee share ownership on decision making efficiency.
Employee share ownership encourages employees to become
too involved in the decision-making process, which leads to
a collective decision-making problem and undermines man-
agerial authority.51 Yet, a higher level of involvement can
just as well be understood positively. For example, it is not
taken into account that it can also be helpful to include dif-
ferent competencies in the decision-making process. In fact,
it is beneficial to involve employees in the company, as this
encourages all levels of the hierarchy to consider how to im-
prove the company. Frontline workers, who are often not in-
volved in product process improvement plans, are experts in
this field and their suggestions should be taken into account.
In the long term, this will lead to an improvement in product
quality and the production process.52 It is also conceivable
48See for example E. H. Kim and Ouimet (2014); Kurtulus and Kruse
(2017); Mazibuko and Boshoff (2003).
49See Kurtulus and Kruse (2017), p. 2.
50See Park et al. (2004), pp. 28-30.
51See for example Dow and Putterman (2000); Long (1978); Mazibuko
and Boshoff (2003); Richter and Schrader (2017).
52See Park et al. (2004), p. 7.
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that this effect can be mitigated by different implementations
of the employee ownership structure.
Independent of work motivation and involvement, it is
also possible to find arguments in favour of the general situ-
ation of the employees. Arguments that speak against the im-
provement of the employment situation are vanishingly small
in the literature. Long53 points out that employees can get
the feeling that more work is expected of them through com-
pany shares. In the long term, this could damage productiv-
ity and the working climate. However, the sample used casts
doubt on the generalizability of this result. Another point
is that employees tend to have a poorly diversified portfolio
due to the high proportion of shares in their own company.54
Empirical evidence for this argument is not known.
In contrast, numerous studies prove a positive effect on
employee attitudes. Kaarsemaker, Pendleton and Poutsma55
reviewed more than 50 studies on this topic and summarised
that more than two-thirds of them speak for a positive effect
on attitudes. Frequent reasons for this result are that this
builds up more trust in superiors and promotes pro-social be-
haviour as well as identification and responsibility with one’s
own company.56 Companies with an Employee Ownership
Structure consequently show a healthier corporate culture.
An empirical study such as the one that will be carried
out here has already been dealt with frequently in the litera-
ture, albeit mainly in relation to American companies. Many
studies conclude that a stronger concentration of employee
owners is positively related to the financial performance of
a company.57 Fewer studies find empirical evidence to the
contrary.58 Based on these results and the discussion out-
lined above, it is expected that a similar effect can be found
for European companies. Consequently, the next hypothesis
follows:
Hypothesis 3: Higher ownership concentration
of non-executive employees is positively related
to firm performance.
2.2.4. Concentrated Ownership and Firm Performance
In addition to managers, families and employees, com-
panies can have numerous other shareholders who differ
from one another in their initial motivation. Thomsen and
Pedersen59 make a broader analysis of various owners and
compare their interests. Financial and insurance compa-
nies, for example, attach greater importance to shareholder
value and portfolio diversification, corporate owners attach
importance to business transactions and growth, and govern-
ments take social consequences into account in their actions
in terms of jobs and social welfare. Even more extreme
53See Long (1978), p. 43.
54See Kurtulus and Kruse (2017), p. 3.
55See Kaarsemaker, Pendleton, and Poutsma (2009), p. 17.
56See for example Blasi et al. (2016); Richter and Schrader (2017).
57See for example Blasi et al. (2016); Haldar and Rao (2011); K. Y. Kim
and Patel (2017); Park et al. (2004); Richter and Schrader (2017).
58See for example Faleye et al. (2006); Livingston and Henry (1980).
59See Thomsen and Pedersen (2000), p. 690.
are foundation-owned companies, which are non-profit or-
ganizations without owner monitoring, and which pursue
exclusively charitable purposes. Nevertheless, Thomsen and
Rose60 find that these companies are at least as efficient in
terms of risk-adjusted stock returns, accounting returns and
Tobin’s Q compared to companies with other owner identi-
ties.
This raises the question of whether profit-seeking be-
haviour must be a necessary condition for a successful com-
pany. Corporate success could be a prerequisite for an owner
to realize his individual interests so that each owner benefits
from a higher firm performance. Consequently, the analysis
of firm performance may be less concerned with the indi-
vidual interests of the owner and more with his ability to
realize these goals. A higher concentration of a single owner
should result in that owner being able to realize his interests
more efficiently than in an environment of many different
shareholders with heterogeneous interests.
Theoretically, as discussed above, agency costs play an
important role for block holders. In the literature, it is repeat-
edly emphasised that concentrated owners have economic in-
centives to minimize agency conflicts and actively monitor
managers.61
Multiple studies provide evidence that a controlling block
holder of any type has a significant positive correlation with
firm performance.62
The arguments presented here, therefore, give rise to an-
other hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Firms having a concentrated own-
ership structure perform better than comparable
firms with a dispersed ownership structure.
3. Methodology
In order to test the hypotheses empirically, this study con-
ducts several multiple linear regressions using continuous
and categorical predictors. The aim of this section is to de-
scribe the data used for the analysis as well as the structure
of the applied models and their associated variables.
3.1. Data Sample
To investigate the effects of different owner identities on
the performance of a company, a data set was compiled from
three different databases.
The main data source is the database of employee share
ownership in European companies from the European Fed-
eration of Employee Share Ownership (EFES).63 It contains
data from 31 European countries and comprises a panel of
60See Thomsen and Rose (2004), pp. 344f.
61See for example Demsetz (1983); Shleifer and Vishny (1986).
62See for example Lins et al. (2013); Thomsen and Pedersen (2000); Yix-
iang (2011).
63See EFES (2019).
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2,709 companies from 2007 to 2016, including all listed com-
panies with a stock market capitalisation of at least 200 mil-
lion euros. It thus includes all significant European com-
panies. The listed companies represent 25% of all Euro-
pean listed companies (excluding financial firms), but 99%
in terms of capitalisation and 95% in terms of employment.
In addition, non-listed enterprises with at least 100 employ-
ees and whose employees hold at least 50% of the company
shares are included in the data set. The information in the
EFES database is based on the annual reports provided by the
companies themselves.
For the calculation of firm performance measures, the re-
quired financial data has been extracted from the Thomson
Financial Worldscope database and attached to the compa-
nies contained in the EFES database.
Furthermore, the EFES dataset focuses exclusively on ex-
ecutive and non-executive employee ownership. From this,
variables for determining employee and management own-
ership can be derived. To include additional information on
family owners, the dataset was merged with the Bureau Van
Dijk Orbis database, a continuously updated global database
with extensive information on corporate ownership.
Finally, all companies without ISIN and all companies
without employees were removed from the composite data
sample. In addition, all financial firms (Groups 44 to 47)
were removed using the Industry Portfolios by Fama and
French64. The final sample contains 2,120 companies from
31 European countries. All numeric nonbinary variables have




In order to evaluate the performance of a company, re-
searchers and practitioners utilize numerous different perfor-
mance measures. This thesis focuses on Tobin’s Q and ROA
to evaluate the performance. The choice of these two vari-
ables is meaningful as they describe the company from two
perspectives: market-based and accounting-based.
Tobin’s Q is one of the most commonly used capital mar-
ket performance measures.65 It is calculated by dividing the
market value of a company by the replacement cost of its as-
sets based on the current market price of these assets. So, if
the market value of the company is equal to its replacement
cost, there is a balance between the market value and the in-
trinsic value, and Tobin’s Q equals one. If the value is greater
than one, the market attributes an additional value to the
company. Tobin’s Q can, therefore, also be interpreted as the
expected future performance of a company. A higher Tobin’s
Q is consequently considered a better firm performance.
The second performance measure used in this analysis is
the ROA ratio, which is calculated by dividing net income by
64See Fama and French (n.d.).
65See for example Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003); Richter and
Schrader (2017); Silva and Majluf (2008).
total assets. It is an indicator of how profitable a company is
relative to its assets. From this, it can be inferred how effi-
ciently a company uses its available assets to generate earn-
ings. Unlike Tobin’s Q, ROA is an accounting-based perfor-
mance measure and provides information about the historical
performance of a company. ROA has also been widely used
in the literature to examine the impact of ownership struc-
tures.66
3.2.2. Ownership Structure
As described in section 2.1, the ownership structure of
a company is examined in this thesis based on ownership
identity and owner concentration. In this analysis, it is not
a question of comparing different owner types against each
other in terms of their performance, but rather of examining
the effect of the concentration of a single owner identity. For
this reason, three separate analyses are carried out, one for
management, one for families and one for employee owners.
When determining the owner identity, it should be noted
that a distinction must be made between direct and indirect
ownership. Family businesses, in particular, are often found
to exist in a pyramidal control structure.67 When using an
indirect-ownership measure, a company that is owned by an-
other company, which in turn in owned by a family, would
be attributed to a family. Since indirect ownership is likely
to have a different effect on company behaviour than direct
ownership, only direct owners are considered in this study.
To determine the ownership concentration of an entity,
multiple approaches are used. For management and em-
ployee owners, the concentration of the owner is measured
based on their aggregated fraction of shares. The reason for
this is that these owners are likely to pursue similar inter-
ests by taking comparable decisions (see sections 2.2.1 and
2.2.3). In families, on the other hand, the individual own-
ers play a more important role. For this reason, their con-
centration is measured by the proportion of shares that the
largest family member is holding. For the fourth hypothe-
sis, the fraction of shares of the largest shareholder, who is
commonly called ‘Blockholder’, is used.
The use of such continuous variables is based on the as-
sumption of a linear relationship between the proportion of
shares held by an owner and firm performance. However,
some studies suggest that this relationship is non-linear. In
order to adapt to these results, the ownership concentration
is divided into five groups and represented by four dummy
variables in an additional model. The first dummy variable
covers ownership levels from at least 1% to less than 6%. The
second runs from at least 6% to less than 20%, the third from
20% to 50% and the fourth variable comprises ownership lev-
els of at least 50% of the total shares. According to Kim and
Patel68, the first group corresponds to significant ownership,
66See for example Barontini and Caprio (2006); Villalonga and Amit
(2006); Xia and Walker (2015).
67See Morck et al. (2005).
68See K. Y. Kim and Patel (2017), p. 4.
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the second to strategic ownership, the third to determining
ownership and the fourth to controlling ownership.
Such a partition is too granular for blockholders, as the
median blockholder owns 29.50% of all shares while, for ex-
ample, the median management concentration in the sample
is 0.18% (cp. Table 1). For this reason, two thresholds are
used: One model uses a 25% threshold and the other one a
50% threshold.
3.2.3. Control Variables
Other potential determinants of firm performance are in-
cluded as control variables. The first control variable is firm
size which can be measured by the number of employees and
by the market capitalization. As both of these variables are
strongly correlated (Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.633),
market capitalization is excluded from further analysis to re-
duce the impact of multicollinearity. Measuring firm size us-
ing the number of employees is found to fit this study design
better because it is expected to be less volatile and less prone
to other capital market interferences.
A firm’s debt ratio can influence its net income which in
turn affects the firm performance measures.69 To account for
this effect, leverage is included as a second control variable.
It is calculated by dividing total debt by total assets.
To proxy for firm growth opportunities and future returns,
research and development (R&D) intensity is also included
as a control variable. It is calculated by dividing R&D expen-
ditures by net sales. Including this variable is not common
practice in the literature and has only been used by few re-
searchers.70 For this reason, R&D intensity is included in a
separate model.
To control for year fixed effects, nine dummy variables are
introduced representing the period range from 2008 to 2016.
The dummies are 1 for a particular year and 0 otherwise.
Furthermore, 347 dummy variables are added to control for
an interaction of the country and the industry of a company.
3.3. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the dataset. By
comparing the mean for the concentration variables, a strong
positive skew can be noticed. As this also holds true for the
performance measures and the control variables, all variables
except for ‘Blockholder Concentration’, ‘ROA’ and ‘R&D Inten-
sity’ are log-transformed in further analysis.
The median firm in this sample is rather small, with a
market capitalisation of€ 439 million and 2,545 employees.
Half of the firms in this sample, have a Tobin’s Q between
1.024 and 1.813 as well as ROA between 0.008 and 0.095,
indicating interquartile ranges of 0.789 and 0.087, respec-
tively.
It should be noted that there is a sharp decline in the num-
ber of observations for the control variable ‘R&D Intensity’.
69See Richter and Schrader (2017), p. 404.
70See for example Anderson et al. (2003); Haldar and Rao (2011); Yixiang
(2011).
The reason for this decline is a large number of missing val-
ues for R&D expenditures which may be caused by companies
in which R&D does not take place. For example, companies
from the textiles sector are less likely to undertake R&D in-
vestments than companies in the pharmaceutical industry.71
To further investigate the frequency of different owner
concentration levels, Figure 1 provides a bar chart that de-
picts the number of firms in the sample that report corre-
sponding ownership concentrations in 2016. It can be seen
that the discrepancy in frequencies between different con-
centration levels is more pronounced for employee owners
than it is for management or family owners. Of all sample
firms in 2016, who report at least a significant concentra-
tion of employee owners, 84.51%72 only have between 1%
and 6% of shares held by employees. According to informa-
tion provided by the latest PEPPER report73, this situation
can be explained by the fact that in many European coun-
tries financial participation emerged only in the mid-1980s
and for new member states in Eastern Europe it is still a “re-
cent phenomenon”.
Nonetheless, in regard to the proposed hypotheses, the
prevalence of low concentration levels among all investigated
identities is conspicuous. If a higher concentration were opti-
mal, a different distribution would be expected. This reason-
ing follows the argument by Demsetz and Villalonga74, which
states that if there was a systematic relation between owner-
ship structure and firm performance, non-optimal dispersed
structures should not survive.
3.4. Data Analysis
3.4.1. Multiple Linear Regression
The goal is to test the relation between ownership concen-
tration of individual owner identities and firm performance.
To test the proposed hypotheses, multiple linear regression is
used. The model is constructed as follows:






λ2, j(Country × Industry) j + ui + εi t ,
(1)
where Performance represents (log of) Tobin’s Q and ROA,
i = 1, . . . , Ns is the firm, s = Management, Family, Employee,
Block is the owner identity, Concentrationis represents the
(log of) fraction of shares of an owner type75 and X i refers to
a vector of firm-specific control variables which include (log
of) the number of employees, (log of) leverage, and R&D in-
tensity. Moreover, t = 1, . . . , 9 is the year of observation and
j = 1, . . . , 347 is an interaction of the country and industry
of observation. Besides the unobservable random error term
εi t , the clustered error term ui is used to account for correla-
tion within each firm i.
71See van Pottelsberghe (2020), p. 6.
72453/(453+ 71+ 8+ 4) = 0.8451.
73See Lowitzsch et al. (2009), pp. 207-209 and pp. 81-198.
74See Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), pp. 209f.
75Note that for management and employee owner the aggregated shares
are used to calculate concentration, while for family and block owners the
number of shares of the largest owner is used.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Selected Numeric Variables
Variable N Mean 25th pctl. Median 75th pctl. SD
Management Concentration 18,768 6.983 0.009 0.176 2.22 16.464
Family Concentration 18,898 5.269 0 0.02 4.07 12.04
Employee Concentration 18,767 1.014 0 0.213 1.003 2.263
Blockholder Concentration 18,898 35.066 13.16 29.5 51.48 25.177
Tobin’s Q 17,611 1.65 1.024 1.296 1.813 1.123
ROA 18,250 0.072 0.008 0.043 0.095 0.409
Number of Employees 18,915 12.339 0.765 2.545 8.743 29.274
Market Capitalization 18,895 2,869.45 161.3 439.095 1,656.97 7,817.60
R&D Intensity 7,462 0.305 0.005 0.021 0.068 1.558
Leverage 18,248 0.234 0.08 0.217 0.346 0.182
Concentration Levels in Per Cent, Number of Employees in Thousands, Market Capitalization in Millions
Figure 1: Number of Companies per Concentration Level per Owner in 2016
3.4.2. Multiple Linear Regression using Categorical Predic-
tors
As referenced in section 3.2.2, there is reason to ques-
tion the assumption of a linear relationship between the con-
centration of an owner type and firm performance. For this









λ2, j(Country × Industry) j + ui + εi t ,
(2)
where Cisq is a set of mutually exclusive dummy variables
for each concentration level q = significant, strategic, de-
termining, controlling of an owner s and a firm i. For in-
stance, when the management’s aggregated fraction of shares
is 40%, C(is,determining) is 1 and all other dummies are
0. It should be noted that Cisq has been constructed using
Concentrationis. All other variables remain unchanged.
The goal of this model is to break the continuous con-
centration variable into four categorical predictors. Doing so
allows to compare each individual concentration level to the
baseline group in which an owner is not at all or not signif-
icantly owning company. If the investigated relationship is
indeed non-linear, different coefficients and significance lev-
els are expected for each of these dummy variables.
4. Results
4.1. Management Ownership and Firm Performance
Table 2 shows estimates for equation 1 in which (log
of) Tobin’s Q is regressed on the continuous log-transformed
fraction of shares of management owners. Control variables
are included stepwise in the order of their expected impor-
tance, which has been drawn from existing literature (see
section 3.2.3). The adjusted R2 increases for every model and
all control variables are significant at the 1%-level, highlight-
ing their relevance. Furthermore, the predicted coefficients
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for the control variables are consistent with similar studies.76
‘Number of Employees’ and ‘Leverage’ have negative signs
and do not show unexpected effect sizes. For instance, using
‘Model 4’ a 1% increase in the debt ratio decreases Tobin’s Q
by 0.37%.77 Further contributing to the explanatory value of
the models, the F-test is highly significant for every model.
The model meets the first three assumptions needed for
consistent regression results using ordinary least squares,
while the fourth untestable assumption is commented (see
Appendix B for detailed explanation).
Management owner concentration has a positive and sig-
nificant effect on Tobin’s Q in ‘Model 1’ up to ‘Model 3’.
However, although this effect is rather small: Using ‘Model
3’, an increase from 20% to 30% in the relative number of
shares held by managers improves a company’s Tobin’s Q by
1.11%.78
In ‘Model 4’, the effect is not significant. An explanation
for this is the sharp decline in the number of observations
(from 17,523 to 7,316) when the variable ‘R&D Intensity’ is
introduced because it excludes a substantial number of firms
that changed their ownership structure and hence, a lot of
variance. Noting that the magnitude remains unchanged, it
can be expected that a more exhaustive data set would lead
to significant results. To sum up, Table 2 provides evidence
in support with hypothesis 1.
Table 3 presents regression results when ROA is used as a
dependent variable. It stands out that all estimates are highly
significant. Although the results would support hypothesis
1, Table 3 raises doubts as to whether ROA is an applicable
proxy for firm performance in this study. A potential explana-
tion for the odd results is the data source. This is supported
by looking at how ROA is expected to behave in relation to To-
bin’s Q. As Richter and Schrader79 point out, ROA and Tobin’s
Q tend to be highly correlated. However, for the data sample
used in this study, both variables turn out to be not corre-
lated (Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.113). Regressing
ROA also on the dummy variables again yields highly signif-
icant results. As, however, the sample size and the variance
are small for high levels of concentration (see section 3.3) it
is improbable to observe such a
significant effect. As a last remark, investigating the dis-
tribution of the residuals, a clear deviation from a normal
distribution can be seen (see Appendix C). Applying the ROA
models to other owner types, yield similar significant results.
Although they are not conflicting in terms of direction when
compared to Tobin’s Q, they are questionable in terms of va-
lidity and are therefore not reported for the rest of this thesis.
Estimates for regressing the log of Tobin’s Q on categori-
cal predictors (equation 2) are presented in Table 4. It can be
seen that results for ownership levels between 6 and 20 per
cent are consistently significant across the first three models.
76See for example Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera (2016); Barontini and
Caprio (2006); Demsetz and Villalonga (2001); Faleye et al. (2006).
771− 1.01−0.374 = 0.0037.
78(1+ 0.3/0.2)0.012 = 1.0111.
79See Richter and Schrader (2017), p. 403.
However, their magnitude decreased distinctly. The effect
can be interpreted as follows: Switching from no or non-
significant levels of management ownership to a strategic
level predicts a 6.61% 80 increase in the geometric mean of
Tobin’s Q, according to ‘Model 11’.
However, this effect does not hold for all concentration
levels, indicating that the relation between owner concentra-
tion and firm performance is indeed non-linear. Management
ownership at a determining degree is significant at the 10%
level when controlling for firm size and debt ratio (‘Model
11’). However, higher owner concentrations are not signif-
icant and are only half as large in terms of the magnitude.
When ‘R&D Intensity’ is introduced, the magnitude remains
robust at all concentration levels, although not significant.
Following the argument stated above, it is likely that the lack
of significance is the result of the sharp decline in the number
of observations.
Using the first three models, it can be concluded that the
impact of management owners is largest when they are con-
centrated at a strategic level, and it becomes smaller when
further increasing their concentration. Hence, according to
all models, hypothesis 1 has to be rejected in the sense that
the highest possible managing owner concentration would
yield the highest possible performance. Nonetheless, the sig-
nificance levels and the magnitudes indicate that the rela-
tion follows a non-linear curve that has a maximum some-
where between 6 and 50 per cent. It can be concluded that
an increase in the relative number of management shares is
favourable up to a certain degree.
Due to the fact that the focus of this study lies on the
complete model including all control variables and that the
change in results when fixed effects are introduced is sim-
ilar across all owner identities, in the following, regression
results are reported more concisely.
4.2. Family Ownership and Firm Performance
Table 5 presents estimates for equation 1 (‘Model 13’ and
‘Model 14’) and equation 2 (‘Model 15’ and ‘Modell 16’). In
all models, the log of Tobin’s Q is used as a dependent vari-
able.
Using the proportion of family owner shares as a con-
tinuous variable to measure concentration (‘Model 13’ and
‘Model 14’), in both models, the effect on firm performance
is not significant and very small: A 1% increase in ‘Family
Concentration’ predicts an increase of 0.006%81 in Tobin’s
Q.
Breaking down this variable into four dummies (‘Model
15’ and ‘Model 16’), again reveals that there is a non-linear
relationship. According to ‘Model 15’, compared to a com-
pany in which a family owns less than 1% of all outstanding
shares, a company with significant family ownership is pre-
dicted to only have a 0.50%82 higher Tobin’s Q. This value
80exp(0.064) = 1.0661.
811.010.006 = 1, 00006.
82exp(0.005) = 1.0050.
M. Amroudi / Junior Management Science 6(1) (2021) 81-99 91
Table 2: Regression Results of log of Tobin’s Q on Management Ownership Concentration
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Management Concentration (log) 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.012** 0.012
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
Number of Employees (log) -0.020*** -0.022***
(0.003) (0.006)




Constant 0.898*** 0.956*** 1.116*** 1.012***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.026) (0.047)
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Country × Industry FE No Yes Yes Yes
N 17,595 17,534 17,523 7,316
F -statistic 122.322*** 17.048*** 18.871*** 14.756***
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.328 0.353 0.404
Dependent Variable: Log of Tobin’s Q. Standard Errors are clustered on firm level.
***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1
Table 3: Regression Results of Return on Assets on Management Ownership Concentration
Variable Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Management Concentration (log) 0.004 0.016*** 0.027*** 0.025***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
Number of Employees (log) 0.040*** 0.031***
(0.005) (0.006)




Constant 0.069*** 0.159*** -0.123*** 0.253***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.034) (0.043)
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Country × Industry FE No Yes Yes Yes
N 18,197 18,132 18,121 7,442
F -statistic 3.137* 14.090*** 16.161*** 17.100***
Adjusted R2 0.0001 0.278 0.31 0.439
Dependent Variable: ROA. Standard Errors are clustered on firm level.
***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1
increases to 3.05%83 in case of strategic ownership. How-
ever, it decreases again when the family share proportion
is controlling (- 0.50%) or determining (2.33%). Moreover,
‘Strategic Ownership’ is the only level showing a significant
effect. These results change to only a small extent when also
controlling for ‘R&D Intensity’. The p-value for the dummy
variables increase, but likely due to the decline in the number
of observations.
83exp(0.030) = 1.0305.
To conclude, ‘Strategic Ownership’ is the concentration
related to the strongest firm performance. Hence, hypoth-
esis 2 can only partly be accepted as higher family owner
concentration is related to higher firm performance only up
to a certain degree.
4.3. Employee Ownership and Firm Performance
Table 6 provides estimates for equation 1 (‘Model 17’ and
‘Model 18’) and equation 2 (‘Model 19’ and ‘Model 20’) when
employees are the identity of observation. Again, all models
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Table 4: Regression Results of Tobin’s Q on Management Ownership Concentration (Categorical Predictors)
Variable Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Significant Ownership 0.056*** 0.032** 0.007 0.001
(≥ 1% & < 6%) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.023)
Strategic Ownership 0.121*** 0.094*** 0.064*** 0.059
(≥ 6% & < 20%) (0.027) (0.024) (0.022) (0.039)
Determining Ownership 0.051** 0.070*** 0.041* 0.04
(≥ 20% & < 50%) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.04)
Controlling Ownership 0.026 0.048* 0.021 0.03
(≥ 50%) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.053)
Number of Employees (log) -0.020*** -0.022***
(0.003) (0.006)




Constant 0.896*** 0.955*** 1.116*** 1.017***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.026) (0.047)
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Country × Industry FE No Yes Yes Yes
N 17,595 17,534 17,523 7,316
F -statistic 53.253*** 17.050*** 18.844*** 14.666***
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.33 0.354 0.404
Dependent Variable: Log of Tobin’s Q. Standard Errors are clustered on firm level.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
present a significant F-test and adjusted R2 between 35% and
41% and thus acceptable explanatory power.
Using the fraction of shares that are held by employees as
an independent variable (log-transformed), results are highly
significant (‘Model 17’ and ‘Model 18’). This also holds true
when controlling for ‘R&D Intensity’, which has not been the
case for other owner types. Applying ‘Model 18’, an increase
from 0.5% to 1% in the employee share proportion would
result in an expected increase of 6.93%84 in Tobin’s Q. Hence,
‘Model 17’ and ‘Model 18’ imply that hypothesis 3 can be
accepted.
Using dummy variables to approximate the relationship’s
non-linearity, this impact remains constant for significant
and strategic employee owners. For example, according to
‘Model 20’ switching from companies with non-significant to
companies with significant employee owner concentration,
a 6.82%85 increase in the geometric mean of Tobin’s Q is
expected. When comparing non-significant with strategic
ownership levels, this number is 11.07%86.
Employee owners with determining or controlling con-
centration are not significantly related to firm performance.
Apart from that, they show a negative effect, indicating that
companies which are held to more than 20% by employees
84(1+ 0.01/0.005)0.061 = 1.0693.
85exp(0.066) = 1.0682.
86exp(0.105) = 1.1107.
perform worse than companies that do not issue any or only
a few shares to their employees.
To summarise, employee share ownership and firm per-
formance are only positively related when the ownership
concentration of employees does not exceed the strategic
level. Thus, hypothesis 3 can only party be accepted.
4.4. Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance
To test the hypothesis that firms having a concentrated
ownership structure perform better than comparable firms
with a dispersed ownership structure, three further mod-
els are introduced. First, Tobin’s Q (log-transformed) is re-
gressed on the fraction of shares the largest shareholder is
owning (‘Model 21’). ‘Model 22’ uses a dummy variable to
indicate whether a company is concentrated according to a
25% threshold. ‘Model 23’ repeats this step but with a 50%
threshold. Estimates are presented in Table 7.
The adjusted R2 and F -statistic, as well as all control vari-
ables, remain almost unchanged across all three models. The
concentration variables differ only marginally from zero and
are not significant. Although the coefficient for concentrated
firms at a 50% threshold is smaller than the coefficient at the
25% threshold, no considerable differences can be observed.
To conclude, firms having a concentrated ownership
structure are not related to superior firm performance.
Therefore, hypothesis 4 is rejected.
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Table 5: Regression Results of Tobin’s Q on Family Ownership Concentration
Variable Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
Family Concentration (log) 0.006 0.006
(0.004) (0.007)
Significant Ownership 0.005 0.015
(≥ 1% & < 6%) (0.012) (0.02)
Strategic Ownership 0.030** 0.035
(≥ 6% & < 20%) (0.015) (0.024)
Determining Ownership -0.005 -0.018
(≥ 20% & < 50%) (0.019) (0.03)
Controlling Ownership 0.023 0.022
(≥ 50%) (0.034) (0.068)
Number of Employees (log) -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.021*** -0.022***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
Leverage (log) -0.300*** -0.380*** -0.300*** -0.375***
(0.043) (0.076) (0.043) (0.077)
R&D Intensity 0.032*** 0.031***
(0.008) (0.008)
Constant 1.122*** 1.026*** 1.123*** 1.022***
(0.027) (0.047) (0.028) (0.047)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country × Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 17,528 7,314 17,528 7,314
F -statistic 18.776*** 14.704*** 18.710*** 14.630***
Adjusted R2 0.352 0.403 0.353 0.404
Dependent Variable: Log of Tobin’s Q. Standard Errors are clustered on firm level.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
5. Discussion
5.1. Hypothesis 1
One finding of using equation 2 to analyse the relation-
ship between management share concentration and firm per-
formance is that it is not linear. For this reason, the posi-
tive and significant coefficients estimated in Table 2 (equa-
tion 1) cannot be used as a valid criterion to evaluate the
first hypothesis. Observing that the dummy variables ‘Strate-
gic Ownership’ and ‘Determining Ownership’ remain signifi-
cant across ‘Model 9’ to ‘Model 11’ and that their magnitudes
remain stable across all models, it has been concluded that
ownership at such levels reliably shows a positive effect on
firm performance. However, this conclusion may be prema-
ture without further investigation of potential weaknesses of
the model.
One concern that should be addressed is the following:
The majority of firms in the total sample do not have any
or only have less than 1% of their total shares held by man-
agers.87 The performance of such firms, however, does not
have to be curbed as other beneficial owners can be in place.
871 minus all firms that have a management owner concentration of more
than 1% divided by all firms in the sample = 1 − (227 + 113 + 130 +
81)/2000= 0.7245= 72.45%.
For example, a company with a less than significant propor-
tion of management shares can have a high relative firm per-
formance that is caused by a large fraction of family own-
ers. Therefore, comparing different management owner con-
centrations to a baseline in which owner-managers may not
be represented at all, is detrimental to the model’s signifi-
cance. For this reason, ‘Model 11’ and ‘Model 12’ have been
retested using a filtered data set that exclusively contains
firms with an aggregated management share proportion big-
ger than zero (see Appendix A.1). The results show little
deviation from the initial models. All dummy variables have
positive coefficients in both models (‘Model 11.b’ and ‘Model
12.b’), and significant, strategic and determining levels are
significant in ‘Model 11.b’. Hence increasing the fraction of
shares held by managers from non-significant to strategic lev-
els yields a 6.50%88 increase in Tobin’s Q and a 4.39%89 in-
crease when shifting to determining levels.
To summarise, the initial models used supported the hy-
pothesis that a higher concentration of management owners
leads to higher firm performance up to strategic and deter-
mining levels. This section further investigated one potential
weakness of these models and proposed a modification to ac-
88exp(0.063) = 1.0650.
89exp(0.043) = 1.0439.
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Table 6: Regression Results of Tobin’s Q on Employee Ownership Concentration
Variable Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20
Employee Concentration (log) 0.049*** 0.061***
(0.011) (0.016)
Significant Ownership 0.065*** 0.066***
(≥ 1% & < 6%) (0.012) (0.016)
Strategic Ownership 0.064* 0.105*
(≥ 6% & < 20%) (0.034) (0.059)
Determining Ownership -0.009 -0.023
(≥ 20% & < 50%) (0.037) (0.045)
Controlling Ownership -0.036 -0.038
(≥ 50%) (0.063) (0.061)
Number of Employees (log) -0.026*** -0.029*** -0.026*** -0.028***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
Leverage (log) -0.290*** -0.350*** -0.291*** -0.353***
(0.043) (0.076) (0.044) (0.076)
R&D Intensity 0.032*** 0.032***
(0.008) (0.008)
Constant 1.146*** 1.017*** 1.158*** 1.007***
(0.026) (0.046) (0.026) (0.046)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country × Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 17,522 7,315 17,522 7,315
F -statistic 19.128*** 15.054*** 19.094*** 14.943***
Adjusted R2 0.357 0.409 0.358 0.409
Dependent Variable: Log of Tobin’s Q. Standard Errors are clustered on firm level.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Table 7: Regression Results of Tobin’s Q on Blockholder Concentration
Variable Model 21 Model 22 Model 23
Blockholder -0.0002
Concentration (0.0002)
Blockholder (≥ 25%) -0.004
(0.01)
Blockholder (≥ 50%) -0.00004
(0.01)
Number of Employees (log) -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
Leverage (log) -0.302*** -0.301*** -0.301***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Constant 1.137*** 1.136*** 1.133***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.025)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Country × Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
N 17,528 17,528 17,528
F -statistic 18.755*** 18.750*** 18.748***
Adjusted R2 0.352 0.352 0.352
Dependent Variable: Log of Tobin’s Q. Standard Errors are clustered on firm level.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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count for it. The results reinforce the conclusion that higher
management concentrations are beneficial to a certain de-
gree. A more in-depth examination to determine the position
of this optimal level may be the topic of future research.
5.2. Hypothesis 2
The relation between family ownership and firm perfor-
mance, again, turned out to be non-linear and emphasized
the importance of equation 2 as a valid model. The results
presented in section 4.2 support hypothesis 2 to the extent
that firms having a strategic family ownership structure have
a statistically significant higher Tobin’s Q than firms with no
or no significant family owners.
Nevertheless, this model suffers from the same interac-
tion problem as the management model: The effect of low
concentrations of family owners may be suppressed by the
impact of larger, potentially well-performing owners. To
address this concern, ‘Model 15’ and ‘Model 16’ have been
retested using a filtered dataset that excludes firms without
any family owners (see Appendix A.2). The results do not
change, which highlights their robustness.
Comparing the magnitudes of the estimates for the con-
centration dummies with each other, an interesting pattern
emerges. For instance, using ‘Model 15’, significant owner-
ship does not lead to a noticeable effect in firm performance
(0.005), strategic ownership leads to a significant positive ef-
fect (0.030), for determining ownership, the effect is not no-
ticeable (-0.005), and for controlling ownership, it rises again
(0.023). Thus, the relation indicates to have more than one
optimal concentration level. This would mean that the sim-
ple bell-shaped curve, which has been proposed by Thomsen
and Pedersen90, is in fact more complex. Such a two-peak re-
lation has been discovered by Morck, Schleifer and Vishny91
. Although their finding was related to management own-
ers, the argumentation can be applied to family owners as
well. The initial increase in the effect on Tobin’s Q can be ex-
plained by the increasing incentives of families to increase the
value of their rising stakes. The special value of the families
is demonstrated: synergies are used, information is shared,
and resources are gathered.92 After the first peak, however,
entrenchment effects start to set in that exceed the benefits
of the family owners. After a certain limit, however, there
are no more limits for owners in a positive sense and a pure
convergence-of-interest effect sets in, whereby the success of
the company increases again.
It is questionable whether this effect actually arises from
the interaction of entrenchment and convergence-of-interest
effects and not from irregularities in the data set. The num-
ber of companies with a family concentration of more than
50% is low and last but not least the high p-values disprove
a significant effect. Therefore, it is refrained from fully ac-
cepting the second hypothesis. The result remains that an
90See Thomsen and Pedersen (2000).
91See Morck et al. (1988), pp. 301-302.
92See Silva and Majluf (2008), p. 613.
increased concentration of family owners is only to some ex-
tent related to better performance. Hypothesis 2 is therefore
only partially accepted.
5.3. Hypothesis 3
According to the results presented in 4.3, employee
owner concentration and firm performance are positively
related as long as the concentration levels do not exceed the
strategic level. Hypothesis 3 is, therefore, partly accepted.
This section will further explain why the results are sig-
nificant for low concentration levels but not significant for
higher concentration levels.
Using the decomposed dummy variables, it can be noted
that employee ownership above a 20% threshold does not
lead to better firm performance when compared to firms hav-
ing no or less than significant levels of employee ownership.
However, the sample size for firms representing such high
concentration levels is far from sufficient to draw any mean-
ingful conclusion. For example, for the year 2016, the sam-
ple contains only four companies, that are held to more than
50% by their employees. One possible explanation for this is
that financial participation by employees, especially to a large
extent, is not yet established (see section 3.3). The small
number of examples that prove corporate success with con-
trolling employee owners may be a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The average capital held by employees has doubled in the
last ten years, and there is currently no sign of this trend
weakening.93 Hence, it may take some time before an em-
pirically valuable statement can be made about the impact of
high employee concentrations on company performance. On
the other hand, there are already some arguments against a
good performance of very high concentrations. As already
explained, the increasing interest of employees in the finan-
cial situation of the company can lead to a slowdown in
decision-making processes and a decline in the productivity
of the company.94 An investigation of this hypothesis would
be an interesting topic for future research, especially if the
owner structure is measured by owner involvement and not
by company shares.
If one looks at why employees are involved in compa-
nies in the first place (see section 2.2.3), it becomes clear
that an important reason is to increase employee motivation,
which is supposed to improve company performance. It is
very likely, however, that even a low level of participation is
sufficient to achieve this goal. The advantages that employ-
ees bring with them relate mainly to their knowledge around
the product. This value cannot be compared with the value of
access to capital and networks by, e.g. family owners. More-
over, some firms may introduce employee ownership only to
materialize tax incentives, for which low concentrations are
sufficient.
In summary, it can also be theoretically concluded that
after a certain level, more employee ownership should not
lead to further improvement in company performance.
93Survey of Employee Ownership in European Countries 2017.
94See for example Park et al. (2004); Richter and Schrader (2017).
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In order to test the robustness of the models used and
to support the preliminary conclusion that employees have a
positive influence on the company up to a strategic level, four
further models were tested (see Appendix A.3). As with the
other owners, the dummy models were tested with a filtered
data set containing only records in which a company has
at least a single employee owner (‘Model 19.b’ and ‘Model
20.b’). The results show no noticeable difference, which con-
firms the validity of the models.
In order to examine hypothesis 3 further, the linear rela-
tionship was also tested at low concentration levels (‘Model
17.b’ and ‘Model 18.b’). The goal was to refute the argu-
ment that the relation within low concentrations may not
be positive. For this purpose, log of Tobin’s Q was again
regressed to the continuous variable ‘Employee Concentra-
tion’ (log-transformed). The difference is that the data set
was previously filtered and contains only observations with
an employee concentration between 0% and 6%. The result
is highly significant at the 1% level and indicates that an in-
crease in employee owner concentration is associated with
better firm performance as long as no strategic level is ex-
ceeded.
In conclusion, the presumption is confirmed, and hypoth-
esis 3 is accepted with one constraint.
5.4. Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4 looked at the relation between concentrated
ownership structures in general and firm performance. Re-
sults for the continuous and both categorical models were
insignificant, and hypothesis 4 was rejected.
This result is unexpected in that it contradicts numerous
studies in the literature.95 But it is also in line with the widely
cited argument that underperforming ownership structures
should not survive in the long run.96
It should be noted that the variable ‘Blockholder Concen-
tration’ contains various owner identities besides managers,
families and employees. The fact that evidence in favour of
managers, families and employees has been found in this
study highlights the value of these owners. They bring in




This study uses the fraction of shares of an owner (aggre-
gated or by an individual) to measure the ownership struc-
ture of a company. The implicit assumption of this measure is
that the proportion of shares directly translates to the possi-
bility that an owner can realize his interests and improve firm
performance. However, the number of shares is not necessar-
ily equivalent to the power of an owner. Even owners with a
high fraction of shares can be abused by owners with a small
number of shares.97 For instance, families may be able to ex-
95See for example Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007); Lins et al. (2013);
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000); Yixiang (2011).
96See Demsetz (1983); Demsetz and Villalonga (2001).
97See Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), p. 215.
ert a disproportionally strong influence even at low levels of
concentration, while employees may face a lack of experience
that would allow them to fully exploit their shares.
For this reason, the fraction of shares may not be an accu-
rate proxy for ownership structure and measures that account
for the involvement of an owner should be used. However,
such data has not been available for this study and papers
using different measures are not known.
5.5.2. Interaction Effects
It is a common approach in the literature to look at indi-
vidual owner types in isolation, and most studies focus on a
single owner identity. This, however, does not alter the fact
that interaction effects can play an important role in explain-
ing the impact of a single owner on firm performance. The
existence of multiple different owner identities in a hybrid
ownership structure gives rise to potential conflicts, in which
case, the objectives of the dominant identity will prevail. For
example, family owners may be sensitive to the existence of
other owners.
As the initial models used in this study fail to address
these effects, the models have been retested using a filtered
dataset that requires the owner of observation to be present
in all sample firms. But still, a labour stake of, e.g., 20% may
not be of explanatory value when 50% of shares are held by
managers. To account for this problem, a more rigorous ap-
proach has been chosen by Faleye, Mehrotra and Morck98,
who retested their results using a subset in which the owner
of observation has to be the largest shareholder in all compa-
nies. This approach, however, is not applicable in this study,
as the sample size of such a subset would be too small. A
different solution would be the use of private firms that are
held by a single owner type. Again, this is not applicable here
due to data availability.
5.5.3. Endogeneity
The models used in this study fulfil the underlying as-
sumptions that are needed for ordinary least squares regres-
sion to produce consistent estimates (See Appendix B for de-
tailed description). The fourth assumption is empirically not
testable, but the following can be noted.
Three potential sources have been identified, according
to which this study would suffer from omitted variable bias.
First, there exists the notion that ownership structure is the
product of decisions made by current and future sharehold-
ers, e.g. the decision to offer new shares.99 It includes
the complexity of different interests that differ among owner
identities. This concern is partly addressed in this study by
modelling ownership structure as a set of different owner
types to account for their difference in interests, analysed
in separate regressions. The second source of endogeneity
may be the implementation of the ownership structure. This
issue is especially relevant for employee owners who often
98See Faleye et al. (2006), p. 20.
99See Demsetz (1983), pp. 384-386.
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become an owner in the course of ESOPs or other participa-
tion plans. The effectiveness of employee ownership depends
on whether it is established in a collectivistic or in an individ-
ualistic society.100 This issue is addressed by controlling for
industry-country fixed effects.
Another omitted variable is the importance of experience
and network effects that are gained when being a control-
ling owner for a certain time. According to Pedersen and
Thomsen101, as soon as one becomes owner, this owner will
gain experience and build a network that will strengthen his
position. For this reason, the ownership structure is the self-
reinforcing result of different histories, cultures and trends in
economic development. In Germany, for example, banks are
often important blockholders of a company, as they used to
play a significant supporting role during industrialisation.102
To account for this issue, this study controls for industry-
country fixed effects. However, following this notion, it can
be argued that an optimal ownership structure has been re-
inforced and does not change much over time. Therefore,
firms having a suboptimal ownership structure that changes
over time affect this analysis.
In regard to simultaneity bias, it can be plausibly argued
that either higher ownership concentration causes higher
firm performance or that higher firm performance causes a
higher ownership concentration. To further discuss the latter,
it can be argued that ownership structure is the endogenous
outcome of compensation contracting processes.103 For ex-
ample, if managers expect that the company in which they
work will grow in value, their incentive to demand equity
compensation is particularly high, and the ownership struc-
ture of the firm is adjusted.
As stated above the explanatory variables used in this
study may be correlated with the unobservable, time-invariant
variables of the error term, which is referred to as fixed
effects.104 To control for fixed effects, year and country-
industry dummy variables have been introduced. Error-
terms are clustered on firm-level to account for potential
problems of autocorrelation and non-independence. To con-
clude, endogeneity concerns have been addressed using mul-
tiple approaches and are found to be minimised.
5.5.4. Data
The raw data used for this study show some weaknesses.
Excluding owner concentrations of over 100% and compa-
nies without employees are just some of the filtering steps
taken to correct these errors. A particularly important error,
possibly due to reporting, is erratic changes in owner concen-
tration. For example, in 52 family businesses, a family owner
with more than 50% of all shares suddenly had no shares at
all in the following year, but one or two years later almost the
same number of shares as before. The same error happens
100See Caramelli and Briole (2007), pp. 297-300.
101See Pedersen and Thomsen (1997), pp. 761f.
102See Roe (1993), p. 1971, p. 1929.
103See Cho (1998), pp. 105-106.
104See Roberts and Whited (2012), p. 76.
for 120 firms with the dummy that indicates the 20% thresh-
old. This is problematic in that it erroneously results in many
major changes in the ownership structure, but hardly leads
to any change in Tobin’s Q. As a result, the impact of high
concentration levels may be represented worse than it actu-
ally is. For this reason, the regressions were repeated for all
models, with such jumps being corrected by the arithmetic
mean of the adjacent values for the fraction of shares of an
owner.
6. Conclusion
The relationship between ownership structure and firm
performance has been the subject of a long-running discus-
sion. However, whether this connection is positive, negative
or even significant at all is still undecided in the literature.
Researches have argued and found empirical evidence for ev-
ery viewpoint. This quantitative study finds that (a) a higher
concentration of management, family and employee owners
is to some extent related to higher company performance, (b)
this relationship follows a non-linear pattern, and (c) a con-
centrated ownership structure, ignoring the identity of the
owner, does not influence firm performance.
The results show that when describing the ownership
structure of a company, the identity of the owners must be
taken into account. This is because different owner types
have different interests and risk preferences. Ultimately, each
owner brings certain benefits (e.g. financial and network ac-
cess or information on product and process-specific optimiza-
tion potential) but also disadvantages (e.g. entrenchment
or inefficiency in the decision-making process). The optimal
concentration of an owner is at the level where the advan-
tages of an owner outweigh its disadvantages.
In this study, 2,120 companies from 31 European coun-
tries were examined using two different multiple linear re-
gression models – one that uses a continuous variable to
measure the fraction of shares held and one that divides
this variable into five categorical concentration levels (non-
significant, significant, strategic, determining and control-
ling). Using Tobin’s Q as the primary performance mea-
sure, it is shown for management, family and employee own-
ers, respectively, that companies that have such an owner
at a strategic concentration level perform significantly bet-
ter than comparable companies in which the owner is not
or not significantly represented. Although significant, the ef-
fect is quite small, and practitioners must decide whether a
change in the ownership structure yields a satisfactory high
improvement in performance.
Future literature can make further interesting contribu-
tions to this. On the one hand, it is interesting to investigate
more closely which factors are relevant for determining the
optimal concentration levels. It can be assumed that every
company must find an optimal ownership structure for itself.
Given the possible measurement error, it is also interesting
to conduct this study by including another measure for the
ownership structure, which also takes involvement into ac-
count.
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